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Expenditure Limitations In Campaigns
For Statewide Office In California
In an attempt to regulate and control electioneering and campaigning
in California, the voters on June 4, 1974, passed, by approximately a
70 percent vote," Proposition 9, an initiative measure entitled "Political
Reform Act of 1974.'"2 The Act's provisions, which cover a broad
range of subjects, principally relate to the organization of the new Fair
Political Practices Commission, the requirement of campaign dis-
closures, the limitation of campaign expenditures, the control of lobby-
ists, the regulation of conflicts of interests, and the preparation of state
ballot pamphlets. The creation of the Fair Political Practices Commis-
sion (hereinafter referred to as FPPC, and the limitations on expendi-
tures which may be made for campaigns of statewide candidates and
for ballot measures are two entirely new elements added to existing
law in California.
Pursuant to chapter 3 of the Act, a five member, multi-partisan, in-
dependent FPPC has been created to administer the provisions of the
Act, to adopt necessary regulations, to investigate possible violations of
the Act, and to order compliance therewith.3 The FPPC is required
to investigate possible violations of the Act either on its own initiative
or on receipt of a sworn complaint, and to give any complainant timely
notice of the disposition of his complaint.4 It is also empowered to:
hold hearings; subpoena witnesses and documents; grant witnesses im-
munity from penalty, forfeiture, or criminal prosecution (other than
perjury) after timely notice to the Attorney General; issue cease and
desist orders; and impose penalties of up to $2,000 for each violation.5
Any person may request the FPPC to give an advisory opinion with
respect to his duties under the Act.6
1. Salzman, Complete Primary Election Analysis, 5 CAL. J. 231 (1974).
2. Government Code Section 81000 provides that Title 9 shall be known as the
Political Reform Act of 1974.
3. CAL. GOV'T CODE §83100 et seq.
4. CAL. Gov'T CoDE §83115.
5. CAL. Gov'T CoDE §§83116, 83118, 83119.
6. Government Code Section 83114 explicitly provides that the FPPC is required
to either issue an opinion or notify the person who made the request whether an
opinion will be issued within 14 days. No person who acts in good faith reliance upon
an opinion issued to him shall be subject to civil or criminal liability under the Act, so
long as the individual properly relates the material facts. The advisory opinions are
declared to be public records by section 83114.
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Chapter 5 imposes separate ceilings on the amount of expenditures
which may be incurred by statewide candidates, state central commit-
tees of political parties, and independent committees during the five
month period immediately preceding a statewide election.7  Limita-
tions are also imposed on the amount which may be spent in
furtherance of the circulation or qualification of a statewide petition for
an election ballot" and on the amount which may be spent for or against
a statewide measure that has qualified to appear on a ballotY The pur-
poses of these limitations are to make government more responsive to
the needs of the people by reducing the excessive influence of money
on the political process10 and to abolish laws and practices unduly favor-
ing incumbents in order that elections may be conducted more fairly."1
Despite these laudatory purposes, serious constitutional questions
arise as to whether these spending restrictions unconstitutionally
abridge the rights protected by the first amendment to the United States
Constitution. One of the primary purposes of the first amendment has
been to protect the integrity of the democratic process.' 2 Expenditure
ceilings clearly affect the amount of money which may be spent on poli-
tical advertisements. Since advertising is inherently a part of election
campaigns, these limitations will inhibit to some degree political discus-
sions and debate on issues of public importance.' 3 While the United
States Supreme Court has ruled that commercial advertising is a form
of speech which is not protected by the first amendment freedoms of
speech and press,' 4 a distinction has been drawn between speech made
for a purpose which is substantially profit motivated and speech made
for a purpose which is largely informational or noncommercial, the lat-
ter type of speech being entitled to first amendment protection.', Thus,
7. CAL. Gov'T CODE §85100 et seq.
8. CAL. GOV'T CODE §85200 et seq.
9. CAL. Gov'T CODE §85301 et seq.
10. CAL. Gov'T CODE §81002(b).
11. CAL. GOV'T CODE §81002(f).
12. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-70 (1964); cf. T.
EMERSON, THE SYSTmM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6-7 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
EMERSON).
13. Cf. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 147 (1967); Time, Inc. v.
Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270-71
(1964).
14. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
15. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) the Court stated
that the holding in Chrestensen was based on the fact that the handbills were "purely
commercial advertising" and refused to apply the commercial speech doctrine to a paid
editorial advertisement which "communicated information, expressed opinion, recited
grievances, protested claimed abuses, and sought financial support on behalf of a move-
ment whose existence and objectives are matters of the highest public interest and
concern." Id. at 266. See Comment, Free Speech Implications of Campaign Expendilturc
Ceilings, 7 -ARv. Civ. Rrrrrs-Civ. LiB. L. REv. 214 (1972).
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political advertisements, being primarily aimed at informing the public
rather than at insuring commercial success are entitled to some first
amendment protection.
This comment will examine the potential first amendment challenges
to the validity of limitations on expenditures made for the campaigns
of statewide candidates. As a preface to this discussion, it will be of
assistance to review the substantive provisions of chapter 5 of the Act
which govern the expenditures which may be made during the elections
of statewide candidates and to examine some practical problems raised
in their application and interpretation.' 6
CAMPAIGN EXPENDITURE LIMITATIONS UNDER THE
POLITICAL REFORM ACT OF 1974
California's Political Reform Act of 1974 imposes separate ceilings
on the amount of expenditures which may be incurred during the five
months prior to a statewide election by the following three distinct
groups: candidates for statewide office, state central committees of the
political parties, and independent committees supporting or opposing
statewide candidates. 17 "Statewide candidates" include candidates for
the offices of Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Attorney General, Con-
troller, Secretary of State, Treasurer, and Superintendent of Public In-
struction.' 8 Under the Act an "expenditure" is broadly defined as "a
payment, a forgiveness of a loan, a payment of a loan by a third party,
or an enforceable promise to make a payment, unless it is clear from
the surrounding circumstances that it is not made for political pur-
poses." 9  For purposes of chapter 5 of the Act, the time of the
expenditure is either the time of receipt of consideration or the time
of payment.20 However, in the event that receipt of the consideration
occurs prior to the primary election and payment occurs subsequent
thereto, the value does not accrue toward the general election expendi-
ture limitation but instead is charged only to the primary election.
2'
Payments made for the purposes of registering voters or bringing voters
to the polling places are not considered expenditures under chapter 5
16. The discussion will be limited to the provisions in article 1 of chapter 5
(commencing with §85100) of the Government Code which deal with statewide candi-
dates. The comment will not examine the provisions dealing with limitations on the
circulation of statewide petitions or measures.
17. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§85100, 85102, 85103.
18. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§82052, 82053.
19. CA.. Gov'T CODE §82025.
20. CAL. Gov'T CODE §85107.
21. Id. This could occur if, for example, an enforceable promise to pay were
received prior to the primary but the payment did not occur until after the primary. See
CAL. GOV'T CODE §§82025, 82044.
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and thus are not subject to limitation.22 Since the spending ceiling
placed upon candidates applies only to those seeking statewide elective
office, 23 the expenditures incurred by candidates in city, county, special
district, Board of Equalization,. legislative, and judicial elections are not
subject to any limitation under the Act.24 While spending restrictions
are imposed only during the five months immediately preceding a pri-
mary, general, or special election, the practical effect of these provi-
sions is to prevent unchecked spending during the five months prior
to a special or primary election and during the entire period between
a primary and general election since the time between these two elec-
tions never exceeds five months.25
A. Limits on Expenditures by Statewide Candidates
Under section 85100 of the Government Code, the aggregate
expenditures which may be incurred by a statewide candidate, his
agents, and "controlled committees" 28 are determined by multiplying a
specified amount by the voting age population with an adjustment for
cost of living changes in years after 1974. In the gubernatorial cam-
paign a candidate and the committees he controls may spend seven
cents per voting age citizen in the primary election and up to nine cents
per voting age citizen in the general election.27 Candidates for the
other six statewide offices may spend up to three cents per voting age
citizen in both the primary and general elections.28
In determining what expenditures will be charged to the candidate's
aggregate in computing whether his limitation has been reached, sec-
22. CAL. Gov'T CODE §85108.
23. CAL. GoV'T CODE §§85100, 82052, 82053.
24. CAL. ELECnONS CODE §§22004, 22808, as added by CAL. STATS. 1974, c. 954.
These two provisions authorize cities and counties to limit campaign expenditures in
municipal or county elections. Pending legislation, for example, A.B. 4, 1975-76 Regu-
lar Session (proposed addition of section 85120 et seq. to the Government Code),
would impose monetary ceilings on the amount of expenditures which could be incurred
during the five months prior to an election by candidates for legislative office, state
central committees of political parties, and independent committees supporting or op-
posing such candidates.
25. CAL. ELECTIONS CoDE §§2500, 2501.
26. Section 82016 of the California Government Code defines a "controlled com-
mittee" as one which is controlled directly or indirectly by a candidate or which acts
jointly with a candidate or controlled committee in connection with the making of
expenditures. A candidate is deemed to control a committee under this section if he, his
agent, or any other committee he controls has a significant influence on the actions or
decisions of the committee.
27. CAL. Gov'T CODE §85100.
28. Id. According to the Office of the Secretary of State, the voting age popula-
tion as of January 1, 1974, was about 13.6 million; based upon this estimate, each
gubernatorial candidate would be permitted to spend about $952,000 for the primary
election and $1,224,000 for the general election. All other candidates for statewide
elective office would be limited to an expenditure per election of approximately $408,-
000 each. Legislative Analyst, State of California, Statement of Cost Effect of Proposi-
tions on the June 4, 1974 Primary Election Ballot 11-12 (Apr. 29, 1974).
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tion 85106 provides that the entire amount of an expenditure made by
a candidate in support of two or more candidates is to be charged to
each benefited candidate for purposes of section 85100. Under this
section a question arises as to whether a candidate's aggregate includes
only those expenditures made on behalf of statewide candidates, or
whether it should include all sums spent which fall within the defini-
tion of an expenditure.2 9 A literal reading of section 85100 in con-
junction with section 82025 would seem to include within a statewide
candidate's aggregate expenditures all sums spent by a candidate for
any political purpose, regardless of whether it was spent for the purpose
of electing a statewide candidate.
In addition to the spending limitation imposed on candidates under
section 85100, an incumbent candidate is subject to a further limitation
since he usually has many advantages over his challengers, such as
name identification, free publicity in news programs not subject to
equal time provisions, and use of government facilities such as staff,
office space, and mail privileges. ° Under section 85101 a statewide
incumbent who seeks reelection to the same statewide office which he
or she presently holds is subject to a ten percent reduction in the
amount which may be spent in the campaign. To further neutralize
the incumbent's advantage, the Act also prohibits the mailing of legis-
lative newsletters or other mass mailings at public expense by or on
behalf of any elected state officer after he or she has filed as a candi-
date for an office.
31
B. Limits on Expenditures by State Central Committees
Under section 85102 of the Government Code the aggregate
expenditure which may be incurred by the state central committee of
a political party during the five months prior to a statewide election may
not exceed one cent multiplied by the voting age population with an
adjustment for cost of living changes in years after 1974. The expendi-
tures of committees and subcommittees controlled by a state central
committee are included within this ceiling, but county central commit-
tees are considered independent for purposes of this provision. 2
29. See text accompanying note 19 supra.
30. See, e.g., Winter, Money, Politics and the First Amendment, in H. PENNIMAN
& R. WInTR, JR., CAMPAIGN FINANcES, Two VIEws OF ThE POLmCAL AND CON-
sTrrTrIoNAL IMPLICATIONS 43 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Winter] for a critiue of
some reforms in campaign financing on the basis that they would make it more difficult
to unseat incumbents.
31. CAL. GoV'T CODE §89001.
32. CAL. GoV'T CODE §85102. Generally the expenditures of a state central com-
mittee would not be charged to the candidate's aggregate under section 85100, but if the
state central committee and the candidate act jointly, then apparently the state central
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The language of section 85102 is unclear as to whether the
limitations apply only to expenditures made by the state central com-
mittee in support of statewide candidates or to all expenditures
incurred, including, for example, those made to support legislative can-
didates. A literal reading of the provision would indicate that the state
central committee may spend no more than one cent times the voting
age population, or about $140,000, for any purpose. However,
because the provision falls under article 1, entitled "Statewide Candi-
dates," it could be argued that the limitations apply only to those
expenditures relating to elections for statewide candidates. On the
other hand, the language of section 85103, which limits the expendi-
tures of independent committees, specifies that the limit applies to
statewide candidates. The absence of this specificity in sections 85100
and 85102 may indicate that the drafters intended to include as part
of the limitations on state central committees, as well as on statewide
candidates, all sums spent for a political purpose.33
C. Limits on Expenditures by Independent Committees
Under section 85103 of the Government Code, independent com-
mittees34 supporting or opposing statewide candidates are limited to
expenditures aggregating not more than $10,000 per candidate," but
this limit may be increased if the FPPC approves a committee's state-
ment of intent to exceed.36 If two or more independent committees
act jointly in making expenditures, they are considered as one inde-
pendent committee and are thus subject to a single $10,000 expendi-
ture ceiling.37 If an expenditure is incurred in support of more than
one candidate by one independent committee, section 85106 provides
that "a proportionate amount is charged to each candidate"38 for pur-
poses of determining when the independent committee has reached its
$10,000 per candidate limit. Independent committees desiring to
committee's expenses could be charged to the candidate since the committee could then
be deemed a "controlled committee" under section 82016 of the Government Code.
33. See text accompanying notes 19 and 29 supra.
34. Government Code Section 82031 defines an "independent committee" as a
committee which is not controlled either directly or indirectly by a candidate or con-
trolled committee, and which does not act jointly with a candidate or controlled com-
mittee in connection with the making of expenditures. Under this provision a committee
may be controlled with respect to one or more candidates and independent with respect
to other candidates.
35. Under section 85105 expenditures incurred by independent committees for the
purposes of communication directed to their own members or employees are excluded
from the limitation.
36. CAL. Gov'T CoDE §85104.
37. CAL. Gov'T CODE §85103.
38. CAL,. GOV'T CoDE §85106.
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spend more than $10,000 in support"9 of a candidate are required to
file with the FPPC a statement of intent to exceed the limit, not less
than 60 days prior to the election.40 The FPPC must approve the state-
ment of intent to exceed if it determines the following: the committee
is independent, the committee is supporting in good faith, the com-
mittee intends to spend the money requested, and the committee
has the ability to pay.4' No excess expenditure can be made un-
til there has been approval by the FPPC. Additional expendi-
tures by all of the independent committees supporting one state-
wide candidate may not exceed one cent per voting age citizen.
42
If statements of intent to exceed filed in support of the same candidate
aggregate more than one cent per voting age citizen, an amount within
this maximum is to be apportioned among the filing committees on the
basis of an arithmetic formula to be prescribed by regulation. 43  It is
important to recognize that the Act does not impose an overall ceiling
on expenditures made by all independent committees supporting or op-
posing a candidate; rather it imposes an overall limitation only on the
total amount of additional expenditures above the $10,000 limit in-
curred by each committee supporting a candidate.
Once the statement of intent is approved, the Act provides that:
The Commission shall notify each candidate for the nomination or
office in question other than the candidate supported by the inde-
pendent committee that the limits contained in Section 85100 may
be increased by the amount in the statement of intent filed by the
independent committee, except to the extent that statements of
intent to make expenditures in support of such candidates are also
approved.
44
This provision means that spending limitations imposed on the candi-
date under section 85100 will be increased if independent committees
supporting the candidate do not receive approval for additional expend-
itures in amounts equal to the amounts approved for independent com-
mittees supporting other candidates for the same office.
D. Sanctions
Any person who knowingly or willfully violates the expenditure
limitation provisions of the Act is subject to criminal prosecution as a
39. Committees opposing candidates are not permitted to request such increases in
their expenditures, and they do not benefit from the operation of the equalizer provision
discussed in the text accompanying notes 44-45 infra.
40. CAL. Gov'T CODE §85104.
41. Id. Whether the determination of these factors relates to the time at which the
request was filed or at some other time is not clear.
42. CAL. Gov'T CODE §85104. This would be approximately $140,000.
43. Id.
44. Id.
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misdemeanant." 5 In addition, a fine of up to the greater of $10,000
or three times the amount unlawfully expended may be imposed for
each violation. 6 A person convicted of a violation cannot be a candi-
date for elective office or act as a lobbyist for four years, unless the
court, at the time of sentencing, provides otherwise.47 The Attorney
General is given the primary responsibility for enforcement of these
provisions.48
Civil liability may also be imposed on any person who makes an ex-
penditure in violation of the Act. A civil action may be brought by
the civil prosecutor49 or by any resident for up to the greater of $500 or
three times the amount unlawfully spent. 0 The Act does not specify
whether proof of intent or negligence is essential to the plaintiff's case.
Aside from criminal and civil liability, a violator may be enjoined and
may be subject to disciplinary action by the FPPC.5 ' The Franchise
Tax Board is required to report to the FPPC and the Attorney General
any apparent violation of these provisions which the Board discovers
as a result of its audits and investigations of campaign statements.sa
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CALIFORNIA'S
SPENDING LIMITATIONS
Both the federal and California constitutions contain guarantees of
freedom of speech. 53  Although the first amendment to the United
States Constitution, by its terms, is a limitation only upon Congress, it
is now settled that the guarantees contained within that amendment are
fundamental rights incorporated within the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment and are thereby protected against state infringe-
ment.5 4 It has been said that "there is practically universal agreement
that a major purpose of [the first] amendment [is] to protect free dis-
cussion of governmental affairs,' 'e5 and that there is a "profound
45. CAL. Gov'T CODE §91000.
46. Id.
47. CAL. Gov'T CODE §91002.
48. CAL. Gov'T CODE §91001(a); the city and district attorneys of any city or
county in which a violation occurs have concurrent powers and responsibilities with the
Attorney General.
49. Under section 91001(b) of the Government Code, the civil prosecutor is the
FPPC with respect to the state or any state agency, the city attorney with respect to a
city or city agency, and the district attorney with respect to any other agency.
50. CAL. Gov'T CODE §91005.
51. CAL. GovTCODE §§83116, 91003(a).
52. CAL. GoV'T CODE §90002(c).
53. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I; CAL. CONST. art. I, § §2, 9.
54. See, e.g., Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S.
380 (1927); Sun Co. v. Supreme Court, 29 Cal. App. 3d 815, 105 Cal. Rptr. 873
(1973).
55. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218-19 (1966).
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national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open." 58  The right of free
speech, however, is not absolute, and certain forms of expression have
been subjected to regulation. Although first amendment freedoms
are vital, their exercise must be compatible with the preservation of the
essential rights of a free society which enjoys competing interests, 58 and
thus even the right of free expression in political matters cannot exist
absolutely.59
While the total scope of the first amendment is still unclear, the
Supreme Court in formulating constitutional tests has continually
stressed the necessity of examining the nature of the speech as well
as the nature of the disability imposed.60 This comment will examine
the various tests used by the Court and will analyze their application
to the expenditure limitations imposed on statewide campaigns by the
Political Reform Act of 1974. In this regard it should be noted that
while one test may be more appropriate than another in analyzing the
constitutionality of a statute, several tests may be applicable in scrutiniz-
ing the validity of a particular provision.
A. Clear and Present Danger
The modem criterion for determining the validity of laws absolutely
or directly restricting the freedom of speech is the "clear and present
danger" test.61 This test has usually been applied to laws which
attempt to control the content of speech.62 To uphold the validity of
56. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
57. See, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 49-51 (1961).
There are two primary schools of interpretation of the first amendment-one that holds
the freedoms to be absolute and self-defining, and one that balances them with any
governmental, societal, or other individual interest involved. See Brennan, The Supreme
Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79 HAnv. L. REV. 1,
4-6 (1965). While a majority of the United States Supreme Court has never adhered to
the absolute interpretation, the Court has failed over the years to develop a comprehen-
sive, coherent theory to judge the constitutionality of a statute. See EMEaSoN, supra
note 12, at 717.
58. See, e.g., Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 352-55 (1946) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring).
59. See, e.g., United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Car-
riers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973).
60. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341-42 (1974); United
States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 564
(1973); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968); Konigsberg v. State Bar of
California, 366 U.S. 36, 50-51 (1961); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 126
(1959).
61. As originally stated by Mr. Justice Holmes, 'The question in every case is
whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to
create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that
Congress bas a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree." Schenck v.
United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). For the modem formulation of this test see
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
62. See authority note 61 supra.
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such a law, a court generally must find that there is a clear and present
danger of a substantive evil which is created by a particular form of
speech and that the gravity of any such evil justifies prohibition of the
speech to avoid the danger. 3 The substantive evil must be extremely
serious and the degree of imminence extremely high before an
individual can be subjected to punishment for an utterance.0 4 To
warrant the imposition of an absolute prohibition of speech with
regard to campaign spending regulations, the state has the onerous
burden of showing that the evil resulting from the uncontrolled dis-
bursements of campaign funds is substantial.
While the United States Supreme Court has never been faced with
a case dealing with campaign financing limitations, there are recent
cases in state and lower federal courts which have ruled on the consti-
tutionality of provisions imposing campaign spending ceilings. In a
recent Washington case, Bare v. Gorton,65 a state statute 0 imposing
limitations on expenditures in any election for public office was de-
clared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of Washington on the
grounds that it potentially constituted an absolute prohibition of speech
and that it was impermissibly vague and overbroad. The statute pro-
vided for a single limitation on total expenditures made in any election
campaign in connection with any public office. The court raised a
number of problems relating to the statute's meaning and operation,
including the problem of whether one group or individual could expend
to the limit and thereby preclude others, including the candidate, from
making further expenditures. 67  While the court acknowledged the
state's compelling interest in promoting an open, honest, and effective
electoral process, it questioned whether the particular provision served
the desired goal especially in light of the possible absolute prohibition
of speech.0 '
Although the specific provisions of California's Act differ from
Washington's, the same prohibitory effect may be present. The Wash-
ington statute allowed for the possibility of absolutely prohibiting any
individual from spending on behalf of a candidate if the total ceiling
was reached. The limitations in California, which impose separate ceil-
ings on candidates, 'state central committees, and independent commit-
63. E.g., Weaver v. Jordan, 64 Cal. 2d 235, 411 P.2d 289, 49 Cal. Rptr. 537
(1966); First Unitarian Church v. Los Angeles County, 48 Cal. 2d 419, 311 P.2d 508
(1957).
64. E.g., Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263 (1941); Crosswhite v. Munici-
pal Court, 260 Cal. App. 2d 428, 432, 67 Cal. Rptr. 216, 218 (1968).
65. 84 Wash. 2d 380, 526 P.2d 379 (1974).
66. WASH. RIv. CODE §42.17.140 (Supp. 1974).
67. 84 Wash. 2d at-, 526 P.2d at 381.
68. Id. at -, 526 P.2d at 383.
640
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tees, preclude the result that any one of these distinct groups could pre-
vent the other from spending in support of or in opposition to a candi-
date by its own expenditure. However, in California, when a statewide
candidate makes an expenditure in support of himself and another can-
didate, the entire amount of the sum spent is charged to both benefited
candidates. 69 One candidate could thus expend funds on himself and
another candidate to the maximum allowable amount and thereby pre-
clude the supported candidate from making further expenditures on his
own behalf. This extreme situation can be illustrated by posing a hypo-
thetical of a candidate for Governor utilizing the following slogan:
"Vote for me and John Doe-I know John Doe has been a crook, but
he's the best candidate running for Treasurer." A candidate should
have the right to communicate effectively with his constituency, but it
would appear that he could be silenced altogether if another statewide
candidate over whom he has no control has spent the maximum on his
behalf. It is possible to assert, then, that this California provision, as
in Bare, is susceptible to challenge on the basis of being a direct pro-
hibition of speech, and could be invalid if the stringent clear and
present danger test were used.
Another provision also subject to the challenge that it directly re-
stricts the freedom of speech is section 85104, which requires an
independent committee to get FPPC approval to make expenditures
exceeding the $10,000 limit. The fact that the FPPC approval of state-
ments of intent to exceed is predicated on a finding that the independ-
ent committee supports a candidate raises the question as to whether
this provision, which draws a distinction on the basis of the content of
the expression, should be scrutinized by the clear and present danger
test. Classifications based on the content of speech have long been
disfavored and must be viewed with the gravest suspicion. 70  Since
committees opposing candidates are not allowed to exceed the $10,000
limit, section 85104 discriminates between otherwise indistinguishable
parties on the basis of the content of their speech or expression.
Whether the proper inquiry is derived from equal protection analysis
71
or directly from the first amendment 72 is unclear, but the result has
traditionally been the same: in order for the statute to be valid, the
discrimination must be necessary to further a compelling governmental
69. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 85106.
70. See, e.g., Papish v. University of Missouri, 410 U.S. 667, 670 (1973); Cohen
v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 556-58 (1965).
71. See, e.g., Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 99-102 (1972);
Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 273 (1951).
72. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.s. 536, 557 (1965); Schneider v. State
(Town of Irvington), 308 U.S. 147, 164 (1939).
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interest, and the regulation imposing the discrimination must be nar-
rowly tailored to promote that interest.78 Except for the state's interest
in preventing smear-type campaigns, there appears to be no substantial
justification for discriminating against independent committees oppos-
ing candidates. Thus, if the state is unable to show that the discrimina-
tory provision is imposed to remedy a substantial evil, the statute could
be unconstitutional if measured against the clear and present danger
standard.
B. Balancing Approach
Even though a statute may not constitute an absolute prohibition of
speech, it may still be deemed unconstitutional as an indirect or inci-
dental restriction upon expression. While the United States Supreme
Court has at times expressly disclaimed the use of a balancing test,7 4
in a recent case, United States Civil Service Commission v. National
Association of Letter Carriers,5 the Court expressly endorsed a
"balancing" approach to the first amendment's protection of political
activity.78  In upholding the constitutionality of a federal law prohibit-
ing federal employees from taking "an active part in political manage-
ment or in political campaigns, 77 the Court stated that: "[N]either
the right to associate nor the right to participate in political activities
is absolute in any event. Nor are the management, financing, and con-
duct of political campaigns wholly free from governmental regula-
tion."
78
In determining the validity of laws abridging speech indirectly, the
Court has generally balanced two factors: the type and strength of the
particular governmental interest and the type of disability imposed on
the individual. 9 In the usual case the interests in free expression,
73. Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 98-99 (1972).
74. E.g., United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 268 n.20 (1967).
75. 413 U.S. 548 (1973).
76. Id. at 564. In a number of other cases the United States Supreme Court also
explicitly adopted a balancing approach to deal with first amendment issues. E.g., Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341-42 (1974); Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cali-
fornia, 366 U.S. 36, 49-56 (1961); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 126
(1959); Schneider v. State (Town of Irvington), 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939). The bal-
ancing test has been criticized by free speech "absolutists" on the ground that it pro-
vides insufficient protection for first amendment values. See Konigsberg v. State Bar of
California, 366 U.S. 36, 60-71 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting); Barenblatt v. United
States, 360 U.S. 109, 140-54 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting). However, with speech which
contains elements of conduct or "speech plus," even absolutists have been forced to
recognize that a balancing of interests is necessary to assure that such conduct does not
impinge upon some legitimate governmental interest. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
559, 578 (1965) (Black, I., dissenting); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 141-
42 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting).
77. 5 U.S.C. §7324(a)(2) (1970).
78. 413 U.S. at 567 (citations omitted).
79. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Konigsberg v.
642
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which derive to a large extent from the needs of an effective
democracy, are balanced against a competing, totally distinct state inter-
est such as the desire to compensate an individual for damage to his
reputation caused by defamatory statements.80  In the case of campaign
spending ceilings, individuals and groups clearly have an interest in
speaking freely, but the government also has first amendment interests
since such regulations serve the purpose of developing an effective
democracy by keeping it accessible to as many persons as possible.8 '
It can be seen that the courts in this situation are confronted with the
difficult task of balancing conflicting interests, both of which are within
the purview of the first amendment.
Two underlying principles emerge in assessing the burden placed on
first amendment rights by the spending limitations. First, the individ-
ual, in order to actively participate in self-government, has a right to
communicate his political preferences.82 Secondly, the public, in order
to exercise this function intelligently, has a right to be informed about
political matters by receiving an adequate flow of information. 8 The
extent to which these rights may be circumscribed by the spending ceil-
ings is the problem inherent in the Act.
Although most of the provisions of the Act do not appear to regulate
the content or quality of the speech, 84 they do regulate the amount of
"paid for" speech which an individual or group can make by prohibit-
ing expenditures beyond a certain amount. While the Act plainly cur-
tails the volume of campaign expenditures, it in no way prohibits an
individual or group from expressing its point of view within the limita-
tions. It may be argued that the infringement on the individual's rights
are minimal if it is determined that the spending limits are sufficiently
liberal to allow anyone who desires to voice his support of or opposi-
tion to any candidate the full opportunity to do so.88  In this regard,
State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36 (1961); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109
(1959).
80. E.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341, 348-49 (1974); Rosen-
blatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92-93 (1963) (Stewart, J., concurring).
81. Professor Emerson states that such "purification" measures are imposed to
promote the goals of a system of free government-to introduce honesty, decency, and
openness into it-and thereby to improve the quality and meaningfulness of expression.
EMERSON, supra note 12, at 633.
82. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Mills v. Alabama, 384
U.S. 214 (1966); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
83. Cf. Kleindienst v. Mandell, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972); Red Lion Broadcasting
Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389-90 (1969); Virginia Citizens Consumer Council v. State
Bd. of Pharmacy, 373 F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Va. 1974).
84. But, the right of an independent committee to exceed the $10,000 limit is
predicated on the expenditure being in support of a candidate. See text accompanying
note 41 supra.
85. Professor Rosenthal states that the validity of any expenditure limitation may
turn on the size of the limitation. He states that "a figure so low as to deny the candi-
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a $10,000 limitation placed on independent committees may be too low
a figure in light of the ever-increasing costs of communication via the
media, and thus such a limitation may constitute an unwarranted dis-
ability.86 Further, the disability imposed on independent committees
opposing a candidate may be particularly burdensome since such
committees cannot get FPPC approval to make additional expenditures.
In addition, the fact that under section 85106 a candidate can be
charged the full amount of another's candidate's expenditure if made
in support of both candidates may make the candidate limitation under
section 85100 particularly burdensome. In all these situations an argu-
ment can be made that the regulation prevents effective dissemination
of ideas and thus constitutes an unconstitutional restriction upon expres-
sion.8
7
In support of the argument that the limitations impose only a minimal
disability on the individual's rights and are thereby constitutional given
the state's interest in regulating such speech, it could be asserted that
the regulations do not unduly restrain individuals from actively partici-
pating in the political process. While the limitations may curtail the
amount of expenditures for such things as paid campaign workers, pro-
fessional management, mailings, brochures, and opinion polls, they do
not restrict participation in activities requiring very little money such
as public speeches, doorbell ringing, and debates, which can be just as
effective in disseminating an individual's views. Spending limitations
date as [sic] reasonable opportunity to get his message across to the voters would be
hard to defend." Rosenthal, Campaign Financing and the Constitution, 9 HARV. J.
LEGis. 359, 388 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Rosenthal]. In this regard, People's Lob-
by, a cosponsor of Proposition 9, claims that the formulae for the expenditure limita-
tions are based on the amount of money spent in past statewide races and on the
amount of money required to effectively reach all registered voters with a significant
amount of information on the issues. PEOPLE'S LOBBY, PROPOSITION 9, THE POLITICAL
REFORM AcT, A FACT FOR CALIFORNIA, A PROPOSAL FOR AMERICA 79 (1st ed. 1974).
If this assertion is true, an argument can be made that the regulations in the Act do
allow effective dissemination of ideas and are therefore constitutional.
86. The cost of purchasing local television broadcast time prior to the November
1974 general election in the Sacramento area during network prime time was approxi-
mately $250 to $900 for a single 30-second spot. Interview with Bruce Hancock, Adver-
tising Salesman, Television Station KXTV, Sacramento, Cal., Apr. 25, 1975. These
figures do not include production costs. For local production this would probably aver-
age $100 per spot. Id. In the 1968 presidential campaign, the production cost for a
package of ten spots ranged from $25,00D to $75,000. DtrNN, FINANCING PRESIDENTIAL
CAMPAIGNS 42 (1972). With these approximate figures on broadcast expenses, it is
questionable whether $10,000 would be an adequate sum to spend for effective commu-
nication.
87. In United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), Mr. Justice Harlan in his
concurring opinion stated that the Court should consider
First Amendment claims in those rare instances when an "incidental" restriction
upon expression, imposed by a regulation which furthers an "important or
substantial" governmental interest and satisfies the Court's other criteria, in
practice has the effect of entirely preventing a "sneaker" from reaching a
significant audience with whom he could not otherwise lawfully communicate.
Id. at 388-89.
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may, in fact, increase the importance of such activities in future elec-
tions which would indicate that the regulations will have a positive ef-
fect on some activities associated with the first amendment.
Three cases suggest another approach in the examination of the bur-
den placed on the first amendment freedoms by the spending ceilings.
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan8 Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC,9 and Mills v. Alabama"0 the United States Supreme Court, in in-
terpreting restrictions on freedom of speech, attached primary impor-
tance to the necessity of an informed public capable of conducting its
own affairs. It has been suggested that these cases indicate that the
proper inquiry as to whether the first amendment is abridged may be
to ask whether the law tends to decrease the overall flow of ideas to
the community."' With regard to spending ceilings, it has been argued
that if a candidate's expenditures are restricted there will be a commen-
surate reduction in his ability to convey information to the public, with
the result that the public will have less exposure to the person it is
asked to choose as its representative. 2 Under the Act this problem
is compounded by virtue of the fact that the entire amount of a candi-
date's expenditure made in support of more than one candidate is
charged to both candidates.
This contention, that the public will be less informed if limitations
on spending are imposed, deserves closer scrutiny. Reasonable limita-
tions may act, in some respects, as an inducement for a candidate to
more forcefully project his views, since he might of necessity become
more actively involved in the campaign if the amount of money avail-
able for such things as "spot" advertisements is limited.93 For example,
a candidate may be induced to participate in television and radio de-
bates, whereas before the imposition of spending restrictions he was
willing and able to rely on a public relations or sell-type campaign. The
candidate may make himself more accessible to newspapers and maga-
zines for in depth question and answer interviews which may elicit more
88. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
89. 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969). The "fairness doctrine" was upheld as promoting
an "uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail." Id.
90. 384 U.S. 214 (1966) (upheld the right of a newspaper editor to publish a
political editorial on election day).
91. Comment, Free Speech Implications of Campaign Expenditure Ceilings, 7
HARv. Cxv. RIGHTS-Civ. Lxi. L. REv. 214, 225-29 (1972); contra Miami Herald v.
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974), in which the Court unanimously invalidated a Florida
statute which granted political candidates a right of reply to adverse editorials.
92. Redish, Campaign Spending Laws and the First Amendment, 46 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 900, 910-11 (1971).
93. "Spot" advertising usually emphasizes "selling" the candidate without a ration-
al discussion of the issues. See J. McGiNNiss, TH-E SELLING OF THE PRESIDENT 1968
(1969); MCCARTHY, ELECTIONS FOR SALE (1972).
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information than do "canned" press releases. It is plausible to assert,
then, that reasonable limitations may actually promote society's interest
in the free flow of meaningful information and fair elections.
The extent to which free speech is circumscribed by spending limita-
tion laws is not, however, the only inquiry in the balancing approach;
the validity of the Act also depends on the nature of the public interest
involved.9 4 While freedom of political speech constitutes perhaps the
most preferred right, the government's obligation to maintain the purity
of the election process has perhaps an equally elevated status. 0 Cam-
paign spending limitations are generally adopted to mitigate many
modem electoral evils, particularly the spiraling campaign costs 0 which
threaten to destroy the equal access of rich and poor to political office.0
7
The state's interest in regulating campaign expenditures may vary,
however, according to the entity being regulated. The limitations on
expenditures imposed by the Act are particularly designed to reduce
the considerable advantage that the candidate with personal and con-
tributed wealth has over an opponent who lacks such resources; in addi-
tion, they attempt to deter the exertion of improper influences on
candidates by contributed wealth. The dangers of unequal access and
improper influence are directly curbed by the imposition of limitations
on candidate expenditures. On the other hand, these same evils are
only indirectly affected by the imposition of spending restrictions on
truly independent committees who desire to spend time, effort, and
money in support of or in opposition to a candidate, and therefore the
94. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974); United
States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 564
(1973); Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 50-51 (1961); Barenblatt v.
United States, 360 U.S. 109, 126-27 (1959).
95. The importance of the governmental interest in protecting the electoral
process was stressed in Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974), United States v. UAW,
352 U.S. 567 (1957), and Burroughs & Cannon v. United States, 290 U.S. 534 (1934).
96. Political spending has risen faster than the consumer price index and has
increased considerably more than the rise in the voting age population. D. DUNN,
FINANCING PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS 43 (1972).
97. CAL. GovT CODE §81002(b) expressly states that the amounts that may be
expended in statewide elections should be limited in order that the importance of money
in such elections may be reduced. High campaign costs may tend to deter able and
willing individuals from seeking office which would have the deleterious effect of deny-
ing the public the services of talented, qualified servants. Spending restrictions may
imbue the election process with equal opportunity by reducing the economic barriers.
Promoting equal political opportunity may also generate a greater diversity of views
which would be responsive to the public need of hearing a full debate of political views.
Cf. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972). However, in a very recent decision the
Oregon Supreme Court held that Oregon campaign expenditure limitation laws violated
Oregon constitutional provisions guaranteeing freedoms of expression and association.
Upon consideration of the "balancing test" and the "compelling interest" test, the court
questioned whether a limit on campaign spending would serve in any significant way to
eliminate the alleged evil that unrestricted campaign spending permits candidates to
"buy" an election. Deras v. Myers, - Ore. -, 535 P.2d 541 (1975).
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state's interest in regulating independent committees may not be as
great. Admittedly, these regulations are enacted to prevent the use
of committees as a means of avoiding spending limitations, but this jus-
tification is questionable if the committee is truly independent of the
candidate. The limitations on independent committees do serve the
state's overall interest in reducing the importance of money in elec-
tions. 8 The fact that the state may not have as strong an interest in'
regulating independent committees may have been recognized by the
drafters of the Act since it does allow independent committees sup-
porting a candidate the opportunity to make additional expenditures.
Some commentators have questioned the effectiveness of expendi-
ture limitations as a means of providing for greater equality in political
opportunity.9 9 One argument is that expenditure limitations favor
incumbents, who are already well known, over challengers, who need
to publicize their candidacies. The Act attempts to deal with this
problem, at least in part, by further limiting an incumbent's expendi-
tures by ten percent 00 and by preventing the incumbent from using
some of his privileges as an elected office holder while a candidate.101
The campaign spending ceilings also serve the purpose of advancing
public confidence in the political process. Confidence in our public
institutions and the electoral process has eroded over the years, as evi-
denced by the low figures on voter turnout in recent elections.
0 2
Effectively enforced spending restrictions may aid in the restoration of
public confidence and integrity in the political process by shifting the
public's opinion away from the idea that elective office is the exclusive
preserve of candidates with personal and contributed wealth. That
such an interest deserves the dignity of judicial consideration was
stressed in the Letter Carriers'°3 case, in which the Court considered
the public's confidence in the system of representative government a
primary factor in its decision upholding the constitutionality of the
Hatch Act.1
0 4
98. CAL. Gov'T CODE §81002(b).
99. E.g., Fleishman, Freedom of Speech and Equality of Political Opportunity:
The Constitutionality of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 51 N.C.L. REv.
389, 455-71 (1973); Winter, supra note 30, at 61.
100. CAL. Gov'T CODE §85101.
101. CAL. GOV'T CODE §89001.
102. A record 3.5 million California voters have been dropped from the voting
rolls, in most cases because they did not cast ballots in the November 1974 election.
The cut amounts to 36 percent of the voters who were eligible to vote in that election.
By contrast, only 2 million voters or 23 percent of the total registered were dropped
from the voting rolls in the "purging" process that followed the 1970 election for
governor. San Francisco Chronicle, Jan. 28, 1975, at 1, col. 7.
103. 413 U.S. 548 (1973).
104. Id. at 565.
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It is plausible to assert, generally, that the imposition of reasonable
campaign expenditure limitations may not present an extreme burden
on the first amendment right of free speech since reasonable regula-
tions may actually have positive effects on certain campaign activities
by increasing the overall flow of meaningful information. However,
after careful consideration of the multiple competing factors involved,
it would appear that particular provisions of the Act may, on balance,
be unconstitutional despite the strong state interest in preventing cam-
paign abuse. The limitation on candidate expenditures would appear
to impose too severe a burden on the candidate's ability to effectively
communicate his ideas in light of the requirements of section 85106
which charge to a candidate's aggregate the entire amount of another
candidate's expenditure when made in support of both candidates.
The limitation on independent committee expenditures would also
appear to result in too severe a disability on the right of free speech;
the size of the independent committee expenditure limitation may be
so low as to deny groups a reasonable opportunity to get their messages
across; the state's interest in restricting independent committee spend-
ing may not be considered strong enough, especially when compared
with the state's stronger interest in regulating candidate expenditures;
finally, the inability of independent committees opposing candidates to
make additional expenditures, while those committees supporting can-
didates have the opportunity, may be too restrictive. While the ulti-
mate decision as to whether the burden on the right of free speech re-
sulting from the imposition of the limitations outweighs the legitimate
governmental interest in "purifying" the electoral process is one for
authoritative judicial determination, it would appear from the foregoing
considerations that certain provisions of the Act may impose an uncon-
stitutional indirect infringement on the right of free speech.
C. Symbolic Speech
Conduct undertaken to communicate an idea may be given protec-
tion under the first amendment, but generally the government's power
to regulate speech becomes greater when conduct is involved, as
opposed to a situation involving "pure speech."' 05 When "speech" and
"nonspeech" elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a
sufficiently important governmental interest in controlling the non-
105. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (upholding the con-
stitutionality of a statute prohibiting the destruction or mutilation of a selective servico
system certificate); People v. Lindenbaum, 11 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 90 Cal. Rptr. 340
(1970). See authorities cited note 135 infra.
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speech element can justify incidental limitations on first amendment
freedoms. 06
A campaign expenditure may itself be considered a form of expres-
sion, regardless of what it buys, inasmuch as the act of spending in itself
is often a means of communicating political expression. Such a view
was recently adopted by a federal court in Hawaii. In Abercrombie
v. Burns,10 7 a federal district court ruled that a Hawaii statute'0 which
imposed a limitation on the amount of money a candidate could expend
in the news media was an unjustifiable infringement of the first amend-
ment freedom of speech. The court held that the statute was uncon-
titutional in view of the fact that an overall expenditure limitation was
already imposed'00 and that the additional limitation was unnecessary
to carry out the governmental interest in promoting the principle of
equality of opportunity to participate in the political process." 0  The
Abercrombie court, in coming to this result, applied the "speech plus
conduct" test enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in United
States v. O'Brien."' The Court in O'Brien did not balance or weigh
the competing interests, but instead held that the regulation of speech
plus conduct would be constitutional if the regulation is within the con-
stitutional power of the government and serves an important state inter-
est that is independent of the speech aspects of the conduct, provided
that the state does not have narrower means available to accomplish
its regulatory purpose."1
2
The California campaign expenditure provisions ostensibly satisfy
the first three criteria set out in O'Brien: the California Constitution
permits electors to propose and enact statutes regulating elections by
initiative;" 3 the reduction of the importance of money in elections and
the accessibility of political channels to people of limited means are legi-
timate governmental interests disassociated from the speech aspects of
the regulation; and the Act is not aimed at the suppression of free ex-
pression. Whether the Act's incidental restrictions on speech are
greater than necessary to further the state's interest is debatable. Some
commentators have suggested that subsidies, tax incentives and credits,
direct financial assistance, and disclosure requirements are less restric-
tive alternatives to achieve the desired goal of equal political opportu-
106. See note 105 supra.
107. 377 F. Supp. 1400 (D.C. Hawaii 1974).
108. HAWAn Rav. STAT. §§1l-206(b)(1) (E), 11-206(b) (2)(E) (Supp. 1974).
109. HAWA REv. STAT. §11-206(a) (Supp. 1974).
110. 377 F. Supp. at 1402.
111. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
112. Id. at 377.
113. CAL. CONST. art. 4, § 22.
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 6
nity." 4 However, the fact that the court in Abercrombie struck down
the media restriction because the existing overall limitation was
deemed to achieve the same legitimate public interest in a less restric-
tive manner may indicate that an overall limitation, as enacted in Cali-
fornia, is sufficiently tailored to promote the state interest to withstand
first amendment challenge.
While campaign expenditures could arguably qualify as "speech-
plus" inasmuch as the act of spending is a means of communication in
itself, the propriety of applying this test to campaign expenditure limi-
tations is questionable. The Court in O'Brien suggested that the
extent to which "conduct" was protected by the first amendment de-
pended on the presence of a "communicative element.""' 5  Given the
present trend to use the mass media extensively in political campaigns,
it may be argued that expenditures are closely tied to political com-
munication, particularly in statewide campaigns covering a large physi-
cal area. For this reason campaign expenditures could be deemed
closer to speech on a continuum from speech to conduct and therefore
more clearly within the protection of the first amendment. Therefore
it is submitted that the balancing approach is a more appropriate means
of testing whether the Act imposes an unconstitutional indirect infringe-
ment on speech.
D. Prior Restraints
The constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and press were
primarily enacted to put an end to restraints and limitations which at
one time in English history had been imposed on individuals seeking
to speak and write publicly.116 An essential element of free speech
is its freedom from censorship prior to publication, and from other forms
of prior restraints.'1 7 Improper prior restraints on communication may
vary in form and degree, but all have the effect of restricting the dis-
semination of ideas. The forms which have been subject to judicial
scrutiny include licensing statutes,"18 injunctions," 9 and governmental
114. E.g., Rosenthal, supra note 85, at 423; Fleishman, Freedom of Speech and
Equality of Political Opportunity: The Constitutionality of the Federal Election Cam-
paign Act of 1971, 51 N.C.L. REv. 389, 479-82 (1973).
115. 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
116. The purpose of safeguarding the rights of free speech is to allow individuals to
speak as they think on matters vital to them and to expose falsehoods through the
processes of education and discussion which is essential to a free government. Thorhill
v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95 (1940).
117. E.g., Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
118. E.g., Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313 (1958); Saia v. New York, 334
U.S. 558 (1948); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
119. E.g., Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
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orders.120 Since the very heart of the first amendment is its protection
against prior restraints, the courts have traditionally closely scrutinized
the constitutionality of such restraints.' 2 ' As the United States
Supreme Court held in New York Times Co. v. United States,122 "Any
system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a
heavy presumption against its constitutional validity."' 28  This stringent
test has been justified on the grounds that prior restraints restrict the
free flow of information' 24 and eliminate the safeguards of judicial pro-
ceedings.25
In a recent case dealing with a prior restraint, ACLU v. Jennings,
2
1
a three judge federal district court ruled that section 104b of title I of
the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971,127 which imposed cam-
paign expenditure limitations on spending for newspaper, magazine,
and outdoor advertisements, was unconstitutional on its face because
it was vague and overbroad, and imposed an impermissible prior
restraint. 28  The Federal Act required any communications medium
which accepted advertisements from any person supporting a federal
candidate to obtain a written certification from the candidate that the
cost of the advertisement would not exceed the candidate's limita-
tion. 29 Since certification had to come from the candidate, he, in ef-
fect, could prevent individuals or groups who desired to express their
support for him from making expenditure. Thus the candidate could
have imposed a prior restraint upon both the advertiser and the medium
whenever he feared that the public would draw undesirable implica-
tions from that particular group or individual's support. Further, when
an individual desired to make an expenditure on behalf of a candidate,
but could not get certification, and also disclaimed the consent of the
candidate, the news medium was required to verify the disclaimer with
the candidate. 130 This requirement was deemed by the Jennings court
120. E.g., Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948); Schneider v. New Jersey,
308 U.S. 147 (1939).
121. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971);
Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963); Staub v. City of Baxley, 355
U.S. 313, 321 (1958); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451 (1938); Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931).
122. 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
123. Id. at 714, quoting Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963).
124. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). See Emerson,
The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 IAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 648, 657-60 (1955).
125. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
126. 366 F. Supp. 1041 (D.D.C. 1973).
127. 47 U.S.C. §803(b) (Supp. 11 1972).
128. 366 F. Supp. at 1049-54.
129. 47 U.S.C. §803(b) (Supp. H 1972). The Federal Act requires certification for
expenditures by or on behalf of any candidate. Thus, the charge to the candidate cannot
be circumvented by independent committees.
130. 11 C.F.R. §4.5 (1973).
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to be so burdensome that the news media would probably refuse to
print any individual advertisement. 131 The court concluded that the
procedures for both the media and the advertiser, considered in con-
junction with the relative ease with which a candidate could prevent
publication, created a prohibited prior restraint.
132
The California Act does not present the same type of problem as
that created by the federal statute because there are separate limita-
tions imposed upon candidates, central committees, and independent
committees. Thus, under the California law no individual or commit-
tee is empowered to prevent another from expending funds to com-
municate political ideas. The California provisions may, though, pose
some of the dangers of prior restraints. 3 A prior restraint exists when
one's -ability to give expression to his thoughts is made dependent on
prior authorization, the expression being permitted only after a permit
or license has been obtained."3 4 Laws subjecting the exercise of
speech to the prior restraint of a license without narrow, objective, and
definitive standards to guide the licensing authority have been ruled
unconstitutional.13 5  The fact that the FPPC is authorized to withhold
approval of independent committee expenditures above $10,000, if it
determines that the committee is not bona fide, lacks the intention and
ability to incur the added expense, or is not acting in good faith, 13
raises the question as to whether such a procedure sets forth standards
"susceptible of objective measurement."' 3 7
While the Act's scheme is distinguishable from the typical licensing
case involving parades and meetings, since an independent committee
must get permission only after it has already spent $10,000, the same
131. 366 F. Supp. at 1053.
132. Id.
133. The fact that under Government Code Section 91003(a) any person residing
in the jurisdiction may sue to enjoin violations of the Act may give rise to a prior
restraint challenge; further, constitutional problems may be raised by Government Code
Section 91002 which provides that violators shall be forbidden to run for any elective
office for a period of four years following the date of conviction. See generally Annot.,
45 A.L.R.3d 1022 (1972).
134. First amendment protection exists only when prior authorization involves
state action. In fennings, although the prior restraints were not imposed by the govern-
ment directly, the court found that state action existed by the imposition of an indirect
system of censorship accomplished by means of criminal sanctions directed at the me-
dia. 366 F. Supp. 1041, 1051 (D.D.C. 1973).
135. A long line of decisions has held that statutes governing the issuance of
licenses to conduct first amendment activities where administrative officials were grant-
ed excessive discretion in determining whether to grant or deny the license are uncon-
stitutional. These cases usually deal with statutes which require licenses for parades and
demonstrations, and courts have allowed regulation only as to time, place, manner, and
duration if the statutes are fairly administered by officials within the range of narrowly
limited discretion. See Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150-51
(1969); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 558 (1965); Burton v. Municipal Court, 68
Cal. 2d 684, 690-92, 441 P.2d 281, 285, 68 Cal. Rptr. 721, 725 (1968).
136. CAL. GoVT CODE §85104.
137. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603-04 (1967).
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judicial scrutiny would appear proper since both involve the licensing
or approval of an activity within the purview of the first amendment's
protection. Since the Act imposes a licensing-type procedure when an
independent committee desires to exceed the $10,000 limit, the Act's
criteria for review should be sufficiently definite to give reasonable
notice to regulated persons of how to comply, and to apprise the FPPC,
judges, and juries of the standards used for determining whether to
grant or deny the request for additional expenditures.1 38  The stand-
ards set forth in section 85104 are arguably too broad and indefinite
and are thus inherently susceptible to arbitrary application. 139 Wheth-
er an independent committee has the ability, and possibly the inten-
tion, to spend can be objectively determined by a showing of present
possession of either funds or pledges. The FPPC does have definite
guidelines for determining whether a committee is truly independent,
since the Act requires the supported candidate to verify whether the
committee is independent of him,140 and specifically sets out the defini-
tion of both independent and controlled committees. 141  As to whether
the committee supports the candidate in good faith, the FPPC could
establish regulations which would evaluate the committee's prior con-
duct. However, without carefully drafted regulations this particular
factor appears to be highly subjective and thus susceptible to challenge
on the basis that it confers on the FPPC "virtually unbridled and
absolute power' '1 42 to deny the approval of the request.
E. Vagueness and Overbreadth
Even when the speech in question may be constitutionally regulated,
138. In Dillon v. Municipal Court, 4 Cal. 3d 860, 869, 484 P.2d 945, 951, 94 Cal.
Rptr. 777, 783 (1971) the court said: "[Any procedure which allows licensing offi-
cials wide or unbounded discretion in granting or denying permits is constitutionally
infirm because it permits them to base their determination on the content of the ideas
sought to be expressed."
139. It is clear that an ordinance or statute is unconstitutional if no standards
whatever are set forth to circumscribe the discretion of officials in granting or denying
licenses. Burton v. Municipal Court, 68 Cal. 2d 684, 690-92, 441 P.2d 281, 2,85, 68 Cal.
Rptr. 721, 725-26 (1968). But, the degree of specificity required to sustain a law is
unclear.
140. CAL. Gov'T CODE §85104. The verification procedure in section 85104 is
distinguishable from the certification requirement in Jennings on several grounds. In
Jennings the candidate's failure to certify resulted in nonpublication, whereas under
section 85104 if a candidate refuses to verify that a committee is independent, the
committee will be deemed controlled, and thus any of the committee's expenditures will
be charged to the candidate's aggregate under section 85100. The candidate's refusal
will not necessarily prevent the publication or expenditure but will only determine who
will be charged the sums spent for purposes of the limitations. If a candidate is near or
has reached his limitation and wants to prevent a committee from spending on his
behalf by refusing to verify their independence, he runs the risk of incurring possible
criminal and civil liability for exceeding his limitation when the committee makes the
expenditure without FPPC approval.
141. CAL. GovT CODE §§82016, 82031.
142. Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150-51 (1969).
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the character of the first amendment itself mandates that the regulation
be carefully drawn so that the deterrent effect on free speech is no
greater than absolutely necessary to foster the public interest necessitat-
ing the statute. 143 In some cases, therefore, the United States Supreme
Court has found a statute unconstitutional on the basis that it was either
overbroad in scope or vague in meaning. 144  Overbreadth review re-
quires analysis of the degree to which legislation unnecessarily restricts
protected conduct and speech beyond the level required to achieve the
valid governmental objectives which it furthers.145  An important func-
tion of the doctrine is to allow a plaintiff to assert the unconstitutionality
of a regulation, even if his conduct might legitimately have been
proscribed, on the ground that a regulation too sweeping in its coverage
could deter others from pursuing expression not validly subject to the
regulation. 46 Thus statutes touching on first amendment freedoms
have traditionally been judged "void on their face" without regard to
evidence of abuse in the application of the statute. 47  Recent decisions
of the Supreme Court, however, have severely limited the scope and
application of the overbreadth doctrine.' 48  In Broadrick v. Okla-
homa149 the Court stated that if a statute was clearly constitutional as
applied to activities of the individual appellants, and if it applied to
"conduct" rather than "pure speech," the appellants would not be
allowed to challenge the provision on the ground that it might be
unconstitutional as applied to others, unless it was "substantially over-
143. E.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 643 (1968); United States v.
Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 268 (1967); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
144. For an analysis of the development of the constitutional doctrines of vague-
ness and overbreadth see Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HAaV.
L. Ruv. 844 (1970); Note, The Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court,
109 U. PA. L. Ruv. 67 (1960); Note, Less Drastic Means and the First Amendment, 78
YAS.L LJ. 464 (1969).
145. Baird v. State Bar of Alabama, 401 U.S. 1 (1971); Zwickler v. Koota, 389
U.S. 241 (1967); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
146. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 487-89 (1965).
147. E.g., United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); Keyishian v. Board of
Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); Thornhill v.
Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
148. A limitation to the scope of the overbreadth doctrine was announced in the
Letter Carriers case when the Court upheld the "active part" prohibition of the Hatch
Act against an overbreadth challenge in spite of the fact that the governmental interests
involved did not require that all partisan political activities of every governmental
employee be proscribed. The Court failed to consider fully the provision's potential
applications and the narrower alternatives available. Thus the Court's measure of law-
fully prohibited expression in relation to the interests of the government was substan-
tially greater than that allowed in the past. The Supreme Court, 1972 Term, 87 HARV.
L. REv. 1, 148-49 (1973). An overbreadth challenge to any of the California campaign
expenditure limitations could arguably be unsuccessful if similar judicial scrutiny is
applied, despite the apparent potential unlawful applications and less restrictive alterna-
tives.
149. 413 U.S. 601 (1973) (involving a state statute restricting political activities of
state employees).
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broad." 150  The Court in Broadrick preferred to deal with allegedly
invalid applications of the statute or regulation in question on a case-
by-case basis.151 It also stated that the facial overbreadth doctrine
would not be invoked when a limiting construction could be placed on
the challenged statute. 5"
The fact that all sums spent for political purposes may be considered
expenditures for purposes of the limitation on candidate and central
committee spending may present the "substantial overbreadth" re-
quired to sustain challenges of facial invalidity, since expenditures for
activities other than those directly affecting the election of a statewide
candidate would seem to fall within the scope of the California regula-
tions. 153 While a limitation on expenditures relating to the election of
statewide candidates may be deemed constitutional under a balancing
analysis, expenditures made for any other political purpose should still
be protected by the first amendment since the alleged state interest of
reducing the importance of money in elections is not being furthered
by controlling expenditures for other political purposes.
Another potential overbreadth problem arises when a candidate
under section 85106 is charged the full amount of another candidate's
expenditure if made in support of both benefited candidates. It is clear
that the state has a legitimate interest in regulating sums spent by a
candidate in furtherence of both his own election and another's can-
didacy. The duplication of charges to both benefited candidates may
be justified as a means of preventing candidates from acting jointly
for the purpose of circumventing the limitation. However, where
there is no joint action, charges to a non-spending candidate argu-
ably do not serve a legitimate state interest. Thus, section 85106
could be unconstitutionally overbroad since it is not limited to sit-
uations where the candidates are acting in concert, but instead im-
poses a regulation on the non-spending candidate without any qualifi-
cation. Facial overbreadth may not exist in these situations, in light
of Broadrick, if a court decides to impose a limiting construction on
the challenged statute. The Letter Carriers and Broadrick cases have
caused much uncertainty in the law in this area, and in light of these
precedents and the strong state interest in preventing campaign abuse
it is difficult to accurately predict the outcome of an overbreadth
150. Id. at 615.
151. Id. at 615-16. The California Supreme Court in County of Nevada v.
MacMillen, 11 Cal. 3d 662, 522 P.2d 1345, 114 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1974) recently applied
this rationale in upholding the Governmental Conflict of Interest Act in the face of an
overbreadth challenge.
152. 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973).
153. See text accompanying notes 34-35 supra.
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challenge. The doctrine of statutory vagueness stems from the due
process clause of the fifth and fourteenth amendments and applies
when a law or regulation restricts or prohibits conduct in such vague
terms that persons of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and application.'54 Where a vague statute operates to inhibit
first amendment rights, a stringent standard has been required to pre-
vent a "chilling effect" on those who desire to speak but who are uncer-
tain whether their message falls within the statute's scope.1"
Applying this doctrine to the expenditure provisions, 56 a vagueness
problem may exist in determining the extent to which "issue" advertis-
ing falls within the purview of the expenditure limitations. The statute
specifically states that "no independent committee shall make expendi-
tures aggregating more than ten thousand dollars. . . in support of or
in opposition to the candidate. . . ",57 The crucial question in inter-
preting the language of the statute is whether advertisements that advo-
cate policies, for example anti-busing legislation, and identify the
positions of candidates on these issues, but do not advocate election or
defeat of the candidates, are within the expenditure limitation. The
federal court in Jennings faced the "issue" advertising problem and
found the Federal Act to be unconstitutionally vague due to Congres-
sional failure to define clearly the crucial phrase "on behalf of a
candidate" so as to exclude from the statute's coverage expressions of
opinion unintended and incapable of regulation.58 It would appear
that section 85104 is vulnerable to challenge on a similar ambiguity.
A similar problem exists in determining what actually constitutes a
committee which is "directly or indirectly" controlled by a candidate
for purposes of ascertaining whether a committee is independent, since
the Act provides no standards or guidelines for the interpretation of
such terms. In United States v. Harriss59 the United States Supreme
Court held that similar language in the Federal Regulation of Lobbying
Act' 60 met the constitutional requirement of definiteness.' 6' Cov-
erage of the Federal Act was partially limited to those persons who in-
154. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108, 114 (1972); Papachristou v.
City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
155. Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195 (1966); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147
(1959).
156. It may be claimed that the criteria set forth in section 85104 for FPPC review
of requests to exceed is unconstitutionally vague. The vagueness of the enunciated
standards for review has been discussed as constituting a potential prior restraint in text
accompanying notes 133-142 supra.
157. CAL. Gov'T CODE §85103.
158. 366 F. Supp. 1041, 1052 (D.D.C. 1973).
159. 347 U.S. 612 (1954).
160. 2 U.S.C. §§261-270 (1964).
161. 347 U.S. at 623-24.
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fluence directly or indirectly the passage or defeat of any legislation in
Congress.162 The Court construed the phrase "directly or indirectly"
to mean "direct communication with members of Congress.' 163 In the
light of the Harriss case, the California provision may similarly be
limited to require that controlled committees are only those committees
directly controlled by a candidate. This narrow construction would be
consistent with the additional language in section 82016 which reads
that "a candidate controls a committee if he, his agent or any other com-
mittee he controls has a significant influence on the actions or decisions
of the committee."' 6 4 Therefore, if the California courts follow the
lead of Harriss, it would appear that this provision of the Act would
be constitutional.
Even though the provisions hereinabove discussed might fall under
the traditional vagueness test, the recent Letters Carriers case 6" may
have relaxed this standard. The Court upheld the Hatch Act's prohibi-
tion on federal employees taking "an active part in political manage-
ment and in political campaigns" against a vagueness attack. The
Court found that sufficient clarity was given to the "active part" phrase
by some 3,000 rulings of the Civil Service Commission so that guid-
ance for federal employees as to what was prohibited had been pro-
vided. Any employee could also obtain an advisory opinion from
the Commission concerning any activity he wished to pursue. The
Letters Carriers holding indicates that limiting constructions in the
form of rulings and regulations in conjunction with an advisory proce-
dure could render a statute valid even though it would otherwise be
unconstitutionally vague. The act contains provisions similar to those
discussed in Letter Carriers, such as those dealing with the FPPC's
power to implement rules and regulations in accord with the Act's pur-
pose'6 6 and to issue advisory opinions regarding any individual's duties
under the Act. 6 7 Because the vagueness of legislation must ultimately
be judged by the degree of uncertainty it creates, it is plausible to con-
clude that with the FPPC's duties, powers, and pronouncements, a person
of ordinary intelligence would be able to understand sufficiently and
comply with the provisions of the Act, especially since these provisions
apply only during the five months prior to an election, which should
allow ample time for any individual or group to obtain advice from the
FPPC.
162. 2 U.S.C. §266(b) (1970).
163. 347 U.S. at 620.
164. CAL. GOVT CODE §82016.
165. 413 U.S. 548 (1973).
166. CAL. Govr CODE §83112.
167. CAL. GOvT CODE §83114.
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CONCLUSION
Unlike many states plagued by ineffective legislation in the form of
vague, unenforceable, and loophole ridden campaign financing laws,
the Political Reform Act of 1974 provides California with the necessary
machinery for controlling and enforcing the new campaign expenditure
limitations. The provisions of the Act nonetheless present several
troublesome first amendment questions. Many of the problems pre-
sented by the Act may be cured by the promulgation of administrative
regulations. For example, the problems of vagueness, overbreadth,
and even the potential prior restraint could be cured by the implemen-
tation of regulations which clearly delineate whether advertisements
that advocate policies or issues and identify the positions of candidates
are within the independent committee expenditure limitation and wheth-
er sums spent by candidates and central committees for political
purposes other than those relating to the election of a statewide candi-
date are subject to limitation under the Act. The standards for
reviewing requests to make additional expenditures by independent
committees supporting a candidate could also be so delineated. In re-
gard to the last suggested administrative act, perhaps a filing procedure
could be established whereby those committees seeking approval would
be required to attest in writing to their good faith; upon receipt of the
sworn affidavit the FPPC would be required to accept it as meeting
the good faith requirement in the absence of countervailing evi-
dence.1 08 Other potential constitutional problems with provisions of
the Act, such as the duplication of charges under section 85106 and the
discrimination on the basis of the content of the speech under section
85104, can only be cured through legislative amendment. In this re-
gard, the Act provides two methods for amendment. One permits the
provisions of the Act to be amended by statute by the legislature when
approved by the electors. 169 The other method requires that a bill in
its final form be delivered to the FPPC for public distribution at least
40 days before it is passed by a two-thirds roll call vote of the member-
ship of each house.170 The potential direct prohibition of speech and
overbreadth problem created by section 85106 could be alleviated by
including as part of the candidate's aggregate only those sums spent on
his behalf by individuals or groups with whom he acts in concert; candi-
date expenditures made by one candidate on behalf of other candidates
should fall under the separate provisions controlling expenditures made
168. Cf. Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966).
169. CAL. Gov'T CODE §81012(b).
170. CAL. Gov'T CODE §81012(a).
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by independent committees, provided that the two candidates are not
acting jointly. Since other individuals and groups can be subject to
more than one limitation under the Act depending on the purpose of
the particular expenditure and the relationship of the candidate and the
spender,171 it would appear that no rational justification exists for not
likewise subjecting a candidate to more than one limitation in the ab-
sence of joint action. It is further suggested that section 85104 be
amended to allow all independent committees the opportunity to get
FPPC approval to make additional expenditures. The implementation
of the foregoing recommendations would eliminate many of the consti-
tutional questions raised by the Act and would thus strike a more favor-
able balance between the government's interest in "purifying" the elec-
toral process and the individual's interest in free speech.
Daniel A. Weitzman
171. Government Code Section 82031 explicitly states that "a committee may be
controlled with respect to one or more candidates and independent with respect to other
candidates."
